Authors: Emirza Adi Syailendra, ANU and Leonard C Sebastian, RSIS

Asia-Pacific international relations since the end of the Cold War and the era of US unipolar rule have mainly focused on cooperation. This has numbed policymakers to the reality of a new era of intensified political, economic and military competition, which requires strategies like AUKUS.

Yet when it comes to Indonesian signage regarding AUKUS, the “Indonesian way” involves subtlety. The crucial question is whether Australia and the United States can read and interpret Indonesia’s unspoken signals and the threshold of its support. Since Indonesia is a democracy, the views of its elite vary, ranging from anxiety to ambivalence. The absence of any outward expression of hostility always signals an implicit consensus: AUKUS does not infringe on Indonesia’s broader regional interests.

The five points declaration on AUKUS published by the Indonesian Foreign Ministry did not criticize the creation of the security pact or its provision allowing Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. The statement used predictable language: “Indonesia is deeply concerned about the continuing arms race and the projection of power in the region.” This was a moderate reaction to that of former Indonesian Foreign Minister Marty Natalegawa negative reaction in the United States stationing marines in Darwin and the Indonesian elite critical US freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.

These indicate that Indonesia’s red lines on regional security have changed. Indonesia is more tolerant than in the past of the near-presence of military materiel and American allies in the region. Yet there are limits to what Jakarta will accept.

First, AUKUS should not aim to pursue a Soviet-style containment of China, but rather should aim to preserve US dominance in the region. Second, Jakarta does not want a realignment of powers that would reduce its ability to imbalance, thus compromising its strategic autonomy. Third, AUKUS should not be an exclusive bloc but should have an inclusive order framework, with ASEAN at its center.

Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi recalled her “good friend”, Australian Foreign Minister Marise Payne, that Australia is a party to the ASEAN Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It was also an indirect message to convey that Indonesia understands the difference between nuclear powered submarines and nuclear submarines.

The acquisition of nuclear weapon submarines would run counter to Indonesia’s commitment to the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. However, Australia’s acquisition of nuclear powered submarines enhance Indonesia’s ability to maintain prudent competition between the United States and China. Indonesia’s repeated reminders to Australia of its commitment to non-proliferation indicate that, as the UKUS negotiations continue, this is the line that cannot be crossed.

Indonesia’s tacit acceptance of the AUKUS Pact must be understood as a tactic to navigate the changing regional order. Indonesia will increasingly signal its support for initiatives that discourage the creation of a G2 involving China and the United States. A G2 condominium puts less emphasis on the role of ASEAN in the region. It could also mean that China’s special treatment for Indonesia would no longer be necessary and that Indonesia would not be able to exploit the US-China rivalry to its advantage.

Historically, Indonesia has focused on maintaining strategic autonomy as major power rivalries intensified. Indonesia’s strategic thinking has often been shaped by the saying of its First Vice President Mohammad Hatta mendayung di-antara dua karang (“rowing between two reefs”). This doctrine is linked to non-alignment and Indonesia’s desire to preserve its strategic autonomy as a post-colonial state.

Yet Indonesia’s interaction with the idea of ​​strategic autonomy has been soft. Former President Sukarno’s tilt towards the Soviet Union to gain US recognition of Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua or former President Suharto’s cautious alignment with the United States to consolidate legitimacy of his regime are two lessons from the past which are still alive in modern Indonesian consciousness.

A limited rivalry condition allows Indonesia to play great powers against each other, reaping economic and political benefits. To establish a more lasting relationship with Indonesia, China favored a condition of hybridity – becoming more confident in Indonesia’s Natuna Islands Exclusive Economic Zone while deepening Sino-Indonesian economic ties. China has been willing to shoulder the burden of risky mega-investments and fulfill Indonesian President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s desire to assert central government territorial control by investing in remote areas of Indonesia from Sulawesi and Kalimantan To North Sumatra.

To neutralize China’s influence over Indonesia, Washington has recognized the renaming of the North Sea Natuna in favor of Indonesia. The United States has also increased its defense cooperation with Indonesia, manifested in the largest joint military exercises in Indonesian-American diplomatic history called Garuda Shield, held last August, which China subsequently protested. In the event of a grand deal between the United States and China, these benefits may cease to accrue to Indonesia. Some form of limited rivalry between the great powers is the most desirable outcome for Indonesia.

Emirza Adi Syailendra is Associate Researcher in the Indonesia Program at RSIS and a PhD candidate at the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies, Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs, The Australian National University.

Leonard C Sebastian is Associate Professor and Indonesia Program Coordinator at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS). He also sits on the College of Adjuncts, Institute for Governance and Policy Analysis, University of Canberra.

A version of this article first appeared here through RSIS.